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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1967, both the United States Congress' and the West Virginia Leg-
islature2 moved to outlaw discrimination on the basis of age. At the
federal level, Congress was responding to President Lyndon Johnson's
1964 Executive Order declaring age discrimination in employment to
be a violation of public policy.' The Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA) was subsequently enacted to "promote employment
of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers
and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of
age on employment. '4 The ADEA sought to balance the right of older
workers to be protected from age discrimination against the prerogative
of employers to control managerial decisions.' The law prohibited the
use of arbitrary age limits and advocated that employment decisions
regarding older employees be based on an individual assessment of
each worker's potential or ability."
The West Virginia Legislature responded to the 1964 passage of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1967. Aware that age discrim-
1. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2, 81
Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994)). "(a) It shall be
unlawful for an employer- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; . . . ." 29 U.S.C.
§ 623. "The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40
years of age." 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
2. The West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1 to -19 (1994)
[hereinafter The Human Rights Act]. House Bill Number 821 was passed on March 11,
1967 by the 58th Legislature of West Virginia (Regular Session), and went into effect on
July 1, 1967. "Equal opportunity in the areas of employment and public accommodations is
hereby declared to be a human right or civil right of all persons without regard to race,
religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, age, blindness or handicap." W. VA. CODE
§ 5-11-2 (1994) (as amended). "The term 'age' means the age of forty or above; ... 
W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(k) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (as amended).
3. Exec. Order No. 11,141, 29 Fed. Reg. 2477 (1964).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
5. SPECIAL COM. ON AGING, DEvELoPMENTs IN AGING: 1993-VOLUME 1, S. REP.
No. 403, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1994).
6. Id
7. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Tit. VII §§ 701-
[Vol. 98:719
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ination was being addressed at the federal level,8 the Legislature incor-
porated "age" as a protected class under the West Virginia Human
Rights Act (Human Rights Act).9 The Human Rights Act mandates
that it is the public policy of West Virginia to provide equal opportu-
nity in the areas of employment, public accommodation, housing ac-
commodation and real property transactions, without regard to race,
religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, age, blindness, or handi-
cap.' ° The denial of equal opportunity rights is "contrary to the prin-
ciples of freedom and equality of opportunity and is destructive to a
free and democratic society.""1 Thus, from its initial passage in 1967,
the Human Rights Act has included age, along with other protected
classes. 2 In contrast, the ADEA is part of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 3 and not part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 4 This asym-
metry between federal and state law has practical implications for age
discrimination litigation in West Virginia. 5
Age discrimination litigation is currently in a state of flux. Serious
questions have been raised as to the philosophical underpinnings of the
716, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)).
8. Telephone Interview with H. Laban White, Jr., Speaker of the West Virginia
House of Delegates in 1967 and sponsor of The Human Rights Act (Jan. 2, 1996). Given
the nature of political assemblies, the decision to include age was not as clear cut as sug-
gested. As those both within and without the legislature researched civil rights issues, they
became aware of local age discrimination issues and this helped to push through the
Senate's amendment to add sex and age. Accord Telephone Interview with the Honorable
Robert C. Halbritter, Judge of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit and former member of the
House of Delegates, representing Preston County, West Virginia in 1967 (Dec. 28, 1995).
9. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF WEST VIRGINIA, 58th Legis. Reg.
Sess., 1771-74 (1967).
10. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-2 (1994).
11. Id.
12. Human Rights Act, ch. 89, 1967 W. Va. Acts 422 (codified at W. VA. CODE
§ 5-11-1 (1967)). At the time of passage the protected classes were limited to race, religion,
color, national origin, age, sex and ancestry.
13. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994)).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17.
15. See West Virginia Univ./West Virginia Bd. of Regents v. Decker, 447 S.E.2d 259,
265 n.8 (W. Va. 1994) (holding that, in disparate treatment cases, the Human Rights Act
treats each of the enumerated protected classes equally).
1996]
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use of age to define a protected class. Some scholars have argued that
age discrimination litigation has more in common with wrongful dis-
charge litigation than civil rights litigation. 6 Unlike race, age is not a
suspect class17 and there is little consistency or certainty in the stan-
dards that are applied to age-based claims. For example, courts are
currently split as to whether a Title VII plaintiff may even base an
age-discrimination claim upon a disparate impact theory of discrimi-
nation, 8 or whether such a plaintiff is confined solely to a disparate
treatment theory under the ADEA."9
Furthermore, there has been a dramatic increase in the willingness
of the judiciary to accept cost justification as an employer defense to
alleged age discrimination. In the early 1980s, the judiciary refused to
tolerate the replacement of older, higher salaried employees by youn-
ger, less costly workers." However by the late 1980s the case law
had become more opaque."1 In 1993, Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins2 marked a watershed in federal age dis-
crimination litigation under the ADEA. In Hazen Paper the Court
16. See George Rutherglen, From Race To Age: The Expanding Scope Of Employment
Discrimination Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491 (1995) [hereinafter Rutherglen]. "In constitu-
tional law, there is no need to protect the old from the rest of the population, most of
whom will live to the same age." Id. at 499.
17. Massachusets Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (holding that age
classification need only be rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest). See
infra note 28 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
19. The Supreme Court left this issue unresolved in its landmark ADEA case, Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993). See generally infra note 96 (listing some
recent cases have held that the analysis in Hazen Paper means that disparate impact analysis
is unavailable under the ADEA). Prior to Hazen Paper many courts had simply assumed
that the disparate impact model was available to ADEA plaintiffs. See infra note 65.
20. See Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945
(1981) (holding that cost motivated employment practices do not necessarily constitute a
reasonable factor other than age defense under the ADEA). See also Leftwich v. Harris-
Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that cost justification for tenure-
based plan for selection of faculty did not establish business necessity defense).
21. Peter H. Harris, Age Discrimination, Wages, And Economics: What Judicial Stan-
dard? 13 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 715, 723 (1990) [hereinafter Harris] ("What appears to
be the general, albeit unsettled, rule for discharges or other practices excluding persons from
employment is that evidence of economic considerations is not sufficient to justify differen-
tial treatment of older workers.").
22. 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993).
[Vol. 98:719
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rejected the view that facially neutral cost-saving policies, which hap-
pened to be age-correlated, were tantamount to unlawful discrimination,
absent a showing that the employer was motivated by age animus.'
Against this backdrop, this Comment seeks to place the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia's decision in West Virginia Univer-
sity v. Decker" into perspective by examining the status of age dis-
crimination litigation in West Virginia. In Decker, the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia unanimously accepted the defendant
University's cost-justification defense to the charge of age discrimina-
tion under the Human Rights Act made by the plaintiff, Professor
Decker. Decker's claim arose out of the University's dual compensation
system for faculty.25 The University used a market-based system to
determine the starting salaries of new faculty hires, whereas existing
faculty salaries were dependent upon the largesse of the West Virginia
Legislature.26 Decker argued that this facially neutral policy of deter-
mining salaries had a disparate effect upon older faculty members, such
as himself, because younger, more inexperienced, new faculty were
routinely paid salaries at or above the level of the older faculty.27
This Comment will argue that the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia's decision, while consistent with other faculty compensa-
tion cases nationwide, sounds a warning note to age-discrimination
plaintiffs. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has now
accepted the validity of at least some cost-justification defenses to
claims of age discrimination based on salary differentials. The court
must now tread carefully in establishing the parameters of cost-justifi-
cation defenses to the Human Rights Act or risk diluting the protection
that the Act offers to all discrimination victims, not just age-discrimi-
nation plaintiffs.
Part two of this Comment examines the development of age dis-
crimination law under the ADEA. First, it studies the nature of age as
a protected class and then tracks the development of the disparate treat-
23. Id.
24. 447 S.E.2d 259 (W. Va. 1994).
25. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 261.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 262.
1996]
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ment and disparate impact analyses for Title VII discrimination claims.
Finally it looks at the increasing divergence between the legislative and
judicial developments of Title VII and the ADEA.
Part three details the court's decision in Decker, looking both at
the factual background and the rationale of the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of West Virginia in finding for the University. In part four, the
court's decision is analyzed. The decision is first compared to other
faculty compensation cases. Secondly, Decker's newly articulated dispa-
rate impact model is considered, as it follows on the heels of the pas-
sage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Finally, this Comment will ad-
dress the challenge to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
posed by the Decker decision.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
A. Age as a Protected Class
At the federal level, discrimination on the basis of age has been
distinguished from other types of employment discrimination by the
passage of the AD)EA. The Supreme Court has held that age-based
classifications do not constitute a suspect class for equal protection
purposes.28
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly free
of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been discrim-
inated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not experienced
a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of
their abilities.29
ADEA claims are typically brought by white males, with relatively
high status and high paying jobs.3" These "victims" are the very class
28. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (citing San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
29. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313.
30. See Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 491. See also Michael Schuster & Christopher
S. Miller, An Empirical Assessment Of The Age Discrimination In Employment Act, 38
INDUS. & LAB. REL. R v. 64, 68 (1984) (reporting that 80.6% of ADEA claims surveyed
[Vol. 98:719
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of employees who have historically benefited from traditional discrimi-
nation against minorities and women. 1 Consequently, the ADEA can-
not be justified doctrinally or empirically because it protects a
disfavored or traditionally powerless minority group from discrimina-
tion. 2 Moreover, age is not an immutable characteristic, nor does it
define an insular and discrete minority.3 3 In addition, unlike race or
sex, age does bear some correlation with decreased performance and
productivity in the workplace. 4 Therefore, the ADEA must be justi-
fied on other grounds. One such justification, supporting the argument
for protecting employees from dismissal without good cause late in
their careers is the lifecycle theory of earnings. 5 According to this
were filed by men; 54.4% of claims were brought by professional or managerial employees).
31. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Book Review, 12 SETON HALL L. REv. 186, 192
(1981).
32. See Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 491. See also RICHARD A. EPSTENI, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws (1992) (arguing that the
federal government should not mandate the consumption of considerable resources for the
purpose of defining and complying with antidiscrimination laws that lack a compelling theo-
retical justification).
33. See Harris, supra note 21, at 732 (stating that older employees have not faced
lifelong bias).
34. "Although the timing varies significantly from individual to individual, at some
point in almost everyone's life, age affects the ability to work. . . . In 1986, the coverage
of the Act was expanded for most covered employees to include all ages greater than or
equal to forty. Because of this expanded coverage, the ADEA continues to prohibit employ-
ment discrimination even after age has affected the ability to work for most people." Harris,
supra note 21, at 716-17. See also Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 499 (disputing the prohibit-
ion against generalizations about age because: (a) everyone's physical and mental abilities
decline at some point with age; (b) "the countervailing benefits of age, such as experience
and judgment, do not invariably outweigh the loss of these abilities"; (c) "the period over
which older workers can gain and utilize new skills is necessarily shorter than for younger
workers"; and (d) the cost of individualized testing may outweigh the gain in accuracy);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 329 (4th ed. 1992) (stating that the
power of a specialized worker is "apt to decline with age").
35. See Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 500. In essence, the theory holds that at various
stages during an employee's working "lifecycle," the employee's productivity may exceed or
fall below his compensation. For example, when first hired, an employee's compensation
may exceed his or her productivity while receiving on the job training. Then the employer
profits from this training as the employee's productivity exceeds his or her compensation.
The situation reverses once again in the employee's later working years. Without statutory
protection, such as the ADEA, the danger is that an employer will opportunistically termi-
nate older employees, thereby destroying their expectation of recompensation for the years
that they were under-compensated. For judicial endorsement of this theory, see Metz v.
19961
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theory, age discrimination statutes protect employees from employers
who breach implied employment contracts that discharge will be for
good cause only, which have arisen from the employment relationship
itself.36
Consequently, the justification for protecting older workers appears
to have more in common with recognizing claims for wrongful dis-
charge than with those classes protected by Title VII, despite the strik-
ing resemblance in the statutory language of both Title VII and the
ADEA.
37
Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1220-21 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). "For
many years employees add to their skills and as a result do better work; eventually the
tables turn, as mental and motor skills slip away." Id. at 1212. See also Note, Employer
Opportunism and the Need for a Just Cause Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 510, 512 (1989)
("rational employers may well have an economic motive for engaging in 'opportunistic
discharges').
36. John J. Donohue m, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrim-
ination Laws, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1586 n.14 (1992) (noting that although this theory
would provide a justification for protection of long-tenured workers, the ADEA is extended
to all workers over forty).
37. For example, section 2000e-2(a) of Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer- (1) to fail or re-
fuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
24 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
Section 623(a) of ADEA, in comparison, states:
It shall be unlawful for an employer- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or 'otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's age; or . . ..
29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
8
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B. Analyzing Employment Discrimination Claims
Traditionally, age-based claims have been subject to the same
judicially created analytical framework as Title VII claims. Anti-dis-
crimination law involves two distinct analytical theories: disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact. The essential differences between the two
theories was captured by the Supreme Court in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.3 8 The Court noted:
"Disparate treatment" . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimi-
nation. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Proof of dis-
criminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be in-
ferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment .... Claims of dis-
parate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress "disparate
impact2' The latter involve employment practices that are facially neutral
in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on
one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity....
Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a dis-
parate-impact theory.39
The evidentiary framework for proving disparate treatment was
first articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.4 ° The McDonnell Douglas analysis was later refined in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine1 and St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks.42
38. 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (citations omitted).
39. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15.
40. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (holding that a plaintiff's prima facie case may be met
by showing the following four elements: "(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that
he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons with
complainant's qualifications"). The elements of the prima facie case will vary as the factual
situation varies. Id. at 802 n.13.
41. 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (Holding that the burden of persuasion never shifts to the
defendant but the burden of production does shift to the defendant to articulate a non-dis-
criminatory reason for making the adverse employment decision. The burden of production
then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the articulated reason is pretextual.).
42. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (holding that an employee who discredits all of an
employer's articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for an employment decision is not
1996]
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The disparate impact theory of discrimination was laid out by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.43 The Court recognized
that if Title VII was limited to prohibiting only overt discrimination,
employers would be able to adopt more subtle forms of discrimination
through the use of facially non-discriminatory practices and policies
which discriminated against those in the protected classes." In Griggs,
the Court found that the defendant's transfer policy had a disparate
impact upon the African-American employees.45 The policy required
that employees have a high school diploma or a minimum test score
before employees could transfer internally to coveted positions.46 Spe-
cifically, the Court found a nexus between the history of societal dis-
crimination and the poor test scores registered by African-Americans.47
The usual method of proof for establishing a presumption of discrimi-
nation in a disparate impact case is through the use of statistical dis-
parities as opposed to focusing on specific incidents of misconduct.48
Eighteen years after the landmark Griggs decision, the Supreme
Court's new conservative majority4" changed the disparate impact
analysis in its decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.50 Jus-
tice White's opinion in Wards Cove sought to increase the plaintiff's
burden in a disparate impact situation.5 Congress passed the Civil
automatically entitled to judgment). See also Teresa C. Postle, Comment, St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks: Interpretation of Title VII Takes A Wrong Turn, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 217
(1993) (analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in Hicks).
43. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
44. See Hiatt v. Union Pac. R.R., 859 F. Supp. 1416, 1432 (D. Wyo. 1994) (review-
ing the historical basis for the Griggs decision).
45. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426.
46. Id. at 428.
47. Id. at 430.
48. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988). See also
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 ("our cases make it
unmistakably clear that '[s]tatistical analyses have served and will continue to serve an im-
portant role' in cases in which the existence of discrimination is a disputed issue") (citations
omitted).
49. See Charles A. Shanor & Samuel A. Marcossan, Battleground For A Divided
Court: Employment Discrimination In The Supreme Court, 6 LAB. LAW. 145, 146 (1990)
(commenting that to a large degree, employment discrimination was the battleground upon
which the sometimes bitterly divided justices waged war among themselves during the 1988-
89 term).
50. 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (5-4 decision, Stevens, J. and Blackmun, J., dissenting).
51. Id. In Wareb Cove, the majority increased the burden on the plaintiff in a dispa-
[Vol. 98:719
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Rights Act of 1991,52 in response to congressional opposition to
Wards Cove and other recent Supreme Court decisions. 3 The passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified the litigants' burdens in a
disparate impact case. 4 An employee must still identify which particu-
rate impact case by: (i) requiring the plaintiff to identify the particular selection practice
used by the employer which caused the disparate impact, and to show its significance
through the use of statistics; (ii) permitting the employer to show that practice had a legit-
imate "business justification" rather than that the challenged practice was essential or indis-
pensable; and (iii) placing the burden on the plaintiff to show that other less restrictive
alternative practices exist which would be equally effective, cost-efficient and serve the
employer's legitimate business goals just as well. Id. at 656-61.
52. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
53. 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in 42 U.S.C. 1981). "The Congress finds that- . . . (2)
the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989) has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections; . .. ."
§ 2, 105 Stat. at 1071. "The purposes of this Act are- . . . (4) to respond to recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order
to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination." § 3, 107 Stat. at 1071. The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended five civil rights statutes (Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964; the Americans with Disabilities Act the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act; the Civil Rights Act of 1866; and the Civil Rights Attorney's Awards Act of 1976).
Generally the Act was responding to eight Supreme Court decisions although it specifically
named only Wards Cove. Other cases included: Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S.
755 (1989); and Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
54. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (emphasis added). Specifically the statute
provides:
(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established
under this subchapter only if- (i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respon-
dent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question
and consistent with business necessity; or (ii) the complaining party makes the
demonstration . . . with respect to an alternative employment practice and the re-
spondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice. (B)(i) With respect
to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a disparate impact as
described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party shall demonstrate that each
particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact except that if
the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of the
respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the
decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice. (ii) If the
respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice does not cause the
disparate impact the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such
practice is required by business necessity.
11
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lar employment practice caused the disparate impact but, if such prac-
tices are impossible to disentangle, courts may now analyze the deci-
sion-making as a single practice.5 Also, Congress has required the
employer to show that the challenged practice is both job-related, for
the particular job at issue, and consistent with business necessity.56
The burden of persuasion in proving business necessity now rests with
the employer.57
C. The Changing Landscape of Age Discrimination Analysis
Against this changing backdrop of Title VII litigation, courts have
been divided on two particular issues, both of which have had a con-
siderable impact on the development of age discrimination law. The
first issue is whether employers may justify their employment decisions
by showing the economic impact that such decisions have or would
have on their financial health. The second issue is whether traditional
Title VII disparate treatment and disparate impact analysis may be
transplanted into the ADEA. These judicial developments post-date the
passage of the ADEA and thus Congress cannot be said to have in-
tended to incorporate them into the Act at the time of its passage.
In Geller v. Markham,58 a fifty-five year old substitute teacher
brought suit alleging that the Board of Education's policy of hiring
teachers with less than five years experience had a disparate impact on
teachers over forty years of age.59 The Second Circuit held that Geller
had succeeded in proving that the Board's policy had a disparate im-




57. See Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill," A Codifi-
cation of Griggs, A Partial Return To Wards Cove, Or All Of The Above?, 43 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 287, 348 (1993) [hereinafter Browne] (arguing that the 1991 Act does not
explicitly alter the Wards Cove standard).
58. 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
59. Id. at 1029-30.
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Board's defense that its policy was justified as a necessary cost cutting
measure in the face of tight budgetary constraints." The court held:
This cost justification must fail, however, because of the clear rule that "a
general assertion that the average cost of employing older workers as a
group is higher than the average cost of employing younger workers as a
group will not be recognized as a differentiation under the terms and pro-
visions of the Act, unless one of the other statutory exceptions applies. To
classify or group employees solely on the basis of age for the purpose of
comparing costs, or for any other purpose, necessarily rests on the assump-
tion that the age factor alone may be used to justify a differentiation -
an assumption plainly contrary to the terms of the Act and the purpose of
Congress in enacting it. Differentials so based would serve only to perpet-
uate and promote the very discrimination at which the Act is directed."'"
Similarly, in Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College," the Eighth
Circuit rejected the defendant college's justification that an employee
selection plan, which had a disparate impact on older, tenured faculty,
was adopted as a cost saving measure. 3 Thus, in both Geller and
Leftwich, the courts rejected cost containment as a "reasonable factor
other than age"6 defense and set the stage for the use of the disparate
impact theory in ADEA cases. 5 The parameters of the "reasonable
60. Id. at 1034.
61. Id. at 1034 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1979)).
62. 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that the school administration discriminated
on the basis of age when tenured faculty were eliminated because their salaries were gener-
ally greater than those of non-tenured faculty).
63. Leftwich, 702 F.2d at 691. The court reasoned as follows:
Here, the defendant's selection plan was based on tenure status rather than explic-
itly on age. Nonetheless, because of the close relationship between tenure status
and age, the plain intent and effect of the defendant's practice was to eliminate
older workers who had built up, through years of satisfactory service, higher sala-
ries than their younger counterparts. If the existence of such higher salaries can be
used to justify discharging older employees, then the purpose of the ADEA will be
defeated.
Id. at 691.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
65. See Harris, supra note 21, at 733-34. But cf Michael C. Sloan, Comment, Dispa-
rate Impact in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Will the Supreme Court Permit
It?, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 507, 530 n.127 (1995) (Noting that Geller and Leftwich are the
only cases which have affirmed an ADEA judgment for a plaintiff based on disparate im-
pact. However, many courts, while finding for the defendant-employer, have stated that it
19961
13
Zdatny: West Virginia University v. Decker: The Future of Age Discriminat
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1996
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
factor other than age" defense was addressed in EEOC v. Chrysler
Corp.66 In Chrysler Corp., the Seventh Circuit described two tests that
an employer must meet to establish cost savings as a "reasonable factor
other than age" defense and effectively limited its availability to situa-
tions of imminent bankruptcy. 7
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Markham v.
Geller, Justice Rehnquist's dissent is noteworthy for its hint of the
Court's future rulings.6" Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the Board's
policy made no reference to age and had, in practice, a significant
impact on teachers outside, as well as within, the protected class. 9
While not denying the fact that the policy would likely have a greater
statistical impact on teachers over age 40,7" he argued that the differ-
ential impact was based upon experience and not age itself.7 Conse-
quently, Rehnquist did not believe that Congress intended to restrain
the decision-making processes of local governments in this way."
The trend established by Geller and Leftwich continued with the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc.73 In Metz, the
court held that it was age discrimination for an employer to discharge
an older employee, whose twenty-seven years of employment had re-
sulted in him receiving a relatively high salary,74 and to replace him
was assumed that such theory was available for ADEA plaintiffs.). See, e.g., Davidson v.
Board of Governors of State Colleges & Univ. for W. Illinois Univ., 920 F.2d 441, 444
(7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) ("Although a number of courts have ruled that disparate impact
is a weapon in the arsenal of the discrimination plaintiff, . . . this court ... has merely
assumed that it is. . . We need not resolve the issue here, since whatever the resolution
our decision must be the same; so we shall assume that disparate impact is a permissible
approach in age discrimination cases; but it is just an assumption.") (citations omitted).
66. EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1984).
67. Id. at 1186 ("First, the necessity for drastic cost reduction obviously must be re-
al . . . .Second, the forced early retirements must be the least-detrimental-alternative means
available to reduce costs.").
68. Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 948.
71. Id. at 949.
72. Id. at 948-49.
73. 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987).
74. Id. at 1203.
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with a younger employee in order to reduce salary costs.75 The major-
ity used the reasoning behind the disparate impact analysis in Leftwich
to argue that the goals of the ADEA would be undermined if cost-
cutting was permitted as a nondiscriminatory justification for an em-
ployment decision in a disparate treatment case.76 In performing a
disparate treatment analysis, the majority used salary as a "proxy" for
age, claiming that age and seniority are strongly correlated."
Despite the lack of judicial sympathy for the cost-justification
defense in the 1980s, a warning note was sounded by Justice
Easterbrook in his prescient dissent in Metz. 71 Justice Easterbrook ar-
gued that nothing in the ADEA prohibited consideration of the rela-
tionship between an employee's productivity and his salary, and that a
firm may lay off or fire employees of any age when economic condi-
tions so require.79 He stated:
Wage discrimination is age discrimination only when wage depends direct-
ly on age, so that the use of one is a pretext for the other; high
covariance is not sufficient, and employers should always be entitled to
consider the relation between a particular employee's wage and his produc-
tivity .... A natural reading [of the ADEA] is that an employer may take
into account wages, which are factors other than age.8"
Justice Easterbrook declares that the purpose of the ADEA is to pro-
hibit adverse employment decisions being made on the basis of myths,
stereotypes, group averages or laziness but not to prevent workers from
being fired when their wage is no longer justified by their level of
75. Id. at 1207.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1208. See also Robert J. Gregory, There Is Life In That Old (I Mean More
"Senior") Dog Yet: The Age-Proxy Theory After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 11 HOFSTRA
LAB. L.J. 391, 393 n.14 (1994) ("'Age-proxy theory' refers to a method of proof that per-
mits a finding of age discrimination to be based on an employer's reliance on an age-related
factor. As so defined, the proxy theory is a device for proving a disparate treatment
claim. . . The thrust of the proxy theory is that the age-related factor is a stand-in for
age itself.").
78. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1211.
79. Id. at 1212.
80. Id. at 1212 (emphasis added).
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productivity.8' Griggs does not condemn all tests or practices which
have a disparate impact, but only those that are not job-related or sup-
ported by strong business reasons."2 Justice Easterbrook posits that
"[i]t is hard to imagine how the use of wages [in making employment
considerations] could not be valid; wages correspond precisely to the
cost of doing business, and hence to profitability." 3 Furthermore, Jus-
tice Easterbrook was particularly critical of his colleagues' fusion of
the rules for disparate treatment and disparate impact - each of which
has a separate method of proof and is built on a different premise.84
It was into this twilight world of age discrimination, where cost
justification defenses were disfavored and disparate impact analysis of
claims was tolerated, that the Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Pa-
per v. Biggins came down in 1993.85 Despite being a landmark case,
the Hazen Paper decision has been less than a guiding light as it has
neither clarified whether disparate impact analysis is available to the
ADEA plaintiff, nor established workable guidelines for handling
employers' cost justification defenses to their discriminatory employ-
ment practices. Justice O'Connor stated in her opinion that "[t]he dis-
parate treatment theory is of course available under the ADEA, as the
language of the statute makes clear .... By contrast, we have never
decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is available under
the ADEA . . . and we need not do so here."86 Most courts had sim-
ply assumed to this point that the disparate impact theory was available
to age discrimination litigants,87 but Justice O'Connor's statement cast
doubt on the validity of this assumption.
81. Id. at 1213.
82. Id. at 1219.
83. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1219.
84. Id. at 1215-16. "The melding of the two strands of discrimination law effectively
relieved Metz of his burden - indeed has allowed him to prevail even though the employer
advanced, and the trier of fact credited, a sufficient reason utterly unrelated to his age. This
unfortunate outcome is the wages of conceptual confusion." Id. at 1216.
85. 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993).
86. Hazen Paper, 113 S. Ct. at 1706.
87. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1211 n.* (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). ("[L]ike the majority I
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In Hazen Paper, the plaintiff brought an ADEA disparate treatment
claim, alleging that he had been fired for an age-determinative reason
as his pension was on the threshold of vesting.88 The Court granted
certiorari to determine, amongst other things, "whether an employer
violates the ADEA by acting on the basis of a factor, such as an
employee's pension status or seniority, that is empirically correlated
with age."89 The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could not suc-
ceed in proving a disparate treatment charge if the employer's adverse
employment decision was motivated by factors other than age, even if
the motivating factors happened to be correlated with age, such as
pension status.9" "Because age and years of service are analytically
distinct, an employer can take account of one while ignoring the other,
and thus it is incorrect to say that a decision based on years of service
is necessarily 'age-based.' 91 In order to succeed therefore, a plaintiff
must establish that an age-correlated factor, such as years of service or
pension status, was being used as a proxy for intentional age discrim-
ination or that the decision was taken on the basis of an "inaccurate
and stigmatizing stereotype."'92
The response to Hazen Paper was swift. Many courts held that the
rationale used in Hazen Paper applied with equal force to age-discrimi-
ination cases where employees alleged that adverse employment deci-
sions occurred as a result of salary considerations.93 Compensation is
88. Hazen Paper, 113 S. Ct. at 1704.
89. Id. at 1705.
90. Id. at 1706.
91. Id. at 1707.
92. Id. at 1706. "Whatever the employer's decisionmaking process, a disparate treat-
ment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's protected trait actually played a role in
that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome. Disparate treatment, thus
defined, captures the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA. It is the
very essence of age discrimination for an older employee to be fired because the employer
believes that productivity and competence decline with old age." Hazen Paper, 113 S. Ct. at
1706.
93. Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir. 1994) (over-
ruling Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc. and hailing Hazen Paper as a vindication of Justice
Easterbrook's dissent). See also Bialas v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 59 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir.
1995) (concluding that even if employer terminated plaintiffs because of their status as high-
er-paid employees, this did not in itself support an inference of age discrimination);
Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co., 58 F.3d 144, 152 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
1996] 735
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typically correlated with age, just as pension benefits are, but such
correlation is not perfect.94 Consequently, post-Hazen Paper, an em-
ployee cannot prove age discrimination under the ADEA, based on
salary considerations alone, even if such employee was discharged
purely to save salary costs.9" Several courts96 have even gone so far
as to hold that Hlazen Paper means that disparate impact analysis is
now unavailable under the ADEA, despite Justice O'Connor's statement
that the matter was still undecided.97 Against this changing federal
legal landscape, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was
faced with a defendant's cost-justification defense to an age discrimina-
tion claim in the comparatively placid surroundings of the Human
Rights Act, in West Virginia University v. Decker.98
ADEA prohibits discrimination on basis of age, not salary or seniority); Allen v. Diebold,
Inc., 33 F.3d 674, 676 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that in Hazen Paper the Supreme Court held
that the ADEA prohibits only actions actually motivated by age, and not those based on
pension, status, seniority or wage rate); Shumacher v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, 528
N.W.2d 374, 382 (N.D. 1995) (holding that a jury instruction that a finding of age discrimi-
nation could be based on a finding that plaintiffs were paid more than their younger col-
leagues had no basis in law); Shore v. A.W. Hargrove Ins. Agency, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 992,
997 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that economic considerations in decision to discharge plaintiff
were not probative of age discrimination).
94. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1126.
95. Id. See also Bay v. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 936 F.2d 112, 117 (2d Cir.
1991) ("IThere is nothing in the ADEA which prohibits an employer from making employ-
ment decisions that relate an employee's salary to contemporaneous market conditions and
the responsibilities entailed in particular positions and concluding that a particular employee's
salary is too high.").
96. See DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 306 (1995) (holding that disparate impact is unavailable because an
employer's decision is, by definition, wholly motivated by factors other than age); EEOC v.
Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that decisions based on crite-
ria which merely tend to affect workers over the age of forty more than those under forty
are not prohibited); Martincic v. Urban Redevelopment Auth., 844 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Pa.
1994), a ffd without opn., 43 F.3d 1461 (3d Cir. 1994) (post-Hazen Paper there is no dispa-
rate impact liability available under the ADEA); Hiatt v. Union Pac. R.R., 859 F. Supp.
1416 (D. Wyo. 1994) (incorporating the disparate impact theory of discrimination enunciated
in Griggs into the ADEA is inappropriate).
97. Hazen Paper, 113 S. Ct. at 1706.
98. 447 S.E.2d 259 (W. Va. 1994).
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Background Facts
Robert L. Decker, a tenured professor at West Virginia University
(University), filed a complaint with the Human Rights Commission on
November 25, 1987 alleging age discrimination by the University with
respect to his salary.99 At the time of filing, Decker, a white male,
was sixty-one years old.' He had joined the University faculty in
1955 in the psychology department of the College of Arts and Scienc-
es.1" ' During his stint in the psychology department, Decker was
awarded tenure. 112 In 1977, Decker accepted a position in the indus-
trial labor relations department and transferred to the University's Col-
lege of Business and Economics, where he was promoted to full pro-
fessor in 1979.13 As of 1987, Decker was one of only two members
in this department and no new faculty had been hired into his depart-
ment since its creation in 1977.204 Decker alleged in his complaint
that the University had denied him an equitable raise in 1987,15 and
that the University routinely gave its newly hired faculty in the College
of Business and Economics salaries at or above the level of his
own. 1
0 6
B. West Virginia University's Compensation System
The University had a dual compensation system for determining
faculty salaries.' 7 The funding for salaries came from the West Vir-
99. Id. at 262.
100. Id. at 261.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 261.
104. Id. at 262.
105. Id. The court noted that Decker did in fact receive the full equitable raise to
which he was entitled in 1987 and this issue was not discussed further in the opinion. Id. at
262 n.2.
106. Id. at 262.
107. Id. at 261.
1996]
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ginia Legislature."°8 Salary adjustments for existing faculty were de-
termined by across the board increases initiated by either the Legisla-
ture or the University's Board of Trustees."0 9 Faculty also received
increases when they were promoted or changed rank."' On the other
hand, starting salaries were based not on the availability of funding
from the Legislature, but rather on a median market rate."' This rate
was calculated from a survey conducted by the American Assembly of
Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB)." 2 The College of Business
and Economics, along with other comparable institutions, would report
to the AACSB what salaries it was paying to new faculty."3 The
AACSB would then collate these figures into an annual report to show
average salaries for specific academic disciplines."4 The University
used the median salary range, plus five percent, to set the salary for a
new hire in a particular discipline. "5 This dual compensation system
caused compression" 6  and inversion1 7  with respect to incumbent
faculty salaries, resulting in junior faculty occasionally receiving higher
salaries than their more senior colleagues." 8





113. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 261.
114. Id. at 262.
115. Id.
116. Compression is defined as occurring "when salaries offered to new hires increase
more rapidly than the average salary increase for experienced, existing faculty." Decker, 447
S.E.2d at 262. "Pay compression results when two groups of employees whose salaries are
determined according to an established differential receive pay increases of unequal percent-
age rates." Averi v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 127, 130 n.5 (1991).
117. Inversion is defined as occurring "when the salaries offered to new faculty, based
on the competitive value in the academic marketplace, are higher than the salaries for exist-
ing faculty." Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 262. "Pay inversion results when the pay of the sub-
ordinate group actually exceeds that of the supervisory group which has more responsibility
and authority." Averi, 23 Cl. Ct. at 130 n.5.
118. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 262.
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C. Procedural History
Decker filed his age discrimination complaint with the West Vir-
ginia Human Rights Commission"9 in November 1987.2' In April
1993, a hearing examiner for the Commission held that the
University's dual compensation system did adversely affect incumbent
faculty members in the protected class,"' but that Decker himself had
suffered no compensable injury because no new faculty had even been
hired in his department, let alone new faculty with a higher salary than
his.' Decker appealed the examiner's finding that he had suffered
no injury. The University appealed the holding that its compensation
policy was discriminatory.'23 In October 1993, the Commission en-
tered a final order holding that not only was the University's policy
discriminatory, but that Decker had also suffered a compensable inju-
ry."'24 Decker was awarded back pay with incidental damages for hu-
miliation, embarrassment, loss of personal dignity, a cease and desist
order, and reimbursement of expenses.'25 The University then ap-
pealed the case to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
26
D. The Issues Presented
The key issue in Decker was whether the University's dual com-
pensation system, which undisputedly had a disparate impact on older
faculty members, was violative of the Human Rights Act, under either
119. The Human Rights Commission was created by the West Virginia legislature to
"place teeth" in the enforcement of the Human Rights Act by providing an administrative
mechanism for the enforcement of the concept of equal opportunity both in the workplace
and the marketplace. Allen v. State of West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 324 S.E.2d
99, 109 (W. Va. 1984).
120. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 262.
121. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(k) (1994) (defining those aged forty and above as being
in the protected class for "age").




126. Id. "From any final order of the commission, an application for review may be
prosecuted by either party to the supreme court of appeals within thirty days from the re-
ceipt thereof . . . ." W. VA. CODE § 5-11-11(a) (1994).
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a disparate treatment or disparate impact theory of discrimination.'27
First, the court had to decide whether a disparate impact theory of
discrimination was even available to an age-discrimination plaintiff
under the Human Rights Act'28 and second, if it was, what the appro-
priate standard should be for proving such a claim. 2 9 Assuming that
such a theory was available, the court then had to decide whether the
University's defense of business necessity justified it distinguishing
between new hires, who received competitive market rate salaries, and
incumbent faculty, whose compensation was largely determined by the
Legislature. 30
E. The Holding of the Case
The court rejected Decker's assertion that he had a disparate treat-
ment claim, and reaffirmed what was required to articulate a prima
facie case of disparate treatment on the basis of age under the Human
Rights Act.' The West Virginia standard was originally derived
from McDonnell Douglas v. Green,'32 and is set forth in the West
Virginia case of Conaway v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp.' The
court then went on to hold that, under the Human Rights Act, a plain-
tiff such as Decker, may posit a disparate impact theory of discrimina-
127. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 266 n.13.
128. Id. at 264.
129. Id. at 266.
130. Id. at 266-68.
131. Id. at 262.
132. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
133. 358 S.E.2d 423 (W. Va. 1986). "In order to make a prima facie case of employ-
ment discrimination, the plaintiff must prove: (1) That the plaintiff is a member of a pro-
tected class. (2) That the employer made an adverse decision concerning the plaintiff. (3)
But for the plaintiff's protected status, the adverse decision would not have been made." Id.
at 429. See also Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 457 S.E.2d 152 (W. Va. 1995). Justice
Cleckley clarified Conaway's articulation of a prima facie case. "Use of the 'but for' lan-
guage in that test may have been unfortunate, at least if it connotes that a plaintiff must
establish anything more than an inference of discrimination to make out a prima facie
case. . . . To further clarify, we now hold that the 'but for' test of discriminatory motive
in Conaway is merely a threshold inquiry, requiring only that a plaintiff show an inference
of discrimination." Id. at 161.
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tion in an age case.'3 4 The court updated the West Virginia standard
for proving a disparate impact case to match that codified in Title VII,
following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.'
Although Decker presented a prima facie case of age discrimina-
tion, the court found that the University's market based salary scale for
new hires was justified by business necessity." 6 The court accepted
the University's testimony that without the use of such a salary scale
for new hires, the University would be unable to attract well-qualified
faculty, which would in turn decrease the University's productivity and
would place the College of Business and Economics' accreditation in
jeopardy." 7 Thus, the court held that "[s]etting starting salaries in
reference to the determined market rates is a business necessity if ac-
creditation and current standards of competence are to be main-
tained.
i38
F. The Court's Rationale
The court rejected Decker's disparate treatment claim finding that
Decker was unable to prove intentional discrimination on the part of
the University, as required by the disparate treatment model. 3 9 Spe-
cifically, Decker could not prove that the University intentionally dis-
criminated against older faculty through its practice of offering compet-
itive market rate salaries to attract the best new faculty.4
In a decision predating Decker, Guyan Valley Hospital, Inc. v.
West Virginia Human Rights Commission,"' the court had held that
the disparate impact theory was available under the Human Rights
134. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 265.
135. Id. at 266 n.l1 (citing Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1991)). The court
noted that Title VII contains no explicit reference to age because the ADEA is distinct and
apart from Title VII. Id. at 265 n.7.
136. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 267.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 263. See also supra note 133.
140. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 263.
141. 382 S.E.2d 88 (W. Va. 1989).
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Act.'42 The disparate impact theory articulated in Guyan, was updated
in Decker to be in harmony with the Civil Rights Act of 1991.' In
Decker, the court declined to distinguish treatment of age-based claims
from claims based on other protected categories under the Human
Rights Act.'44 This decision was based on the plain language of the
Human Rights Act and the legislative purpose behind its passage.'45
The court considered itself bound by the language of the Act, given
that the West Virginia Legislature had not chosen to fashion a distinc-
tion between age and other protected classes. 6
In accepting the University's business necessity defense, the Deck-
er decision was consistent with other faculty compensation cases out of
the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits.'47 The Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia here reasoned that the application of the disparate
impact theory should be limited to that category of jobs where the
workload is essentially identical and workers interchangeable, as on an
assembly line or in entry level positions."' For the managerial and
professional classes, other factors such as job security, job stress, flexi-
bility of schedule, the nature of daily work and prestige associated with
the position, should also be taken into consideration when faced with
an age-discrimination claim.'49 An employer should then be able to
take into account the different credentials and qualifications of each
employee when making salary adjustments. 5 Greater managerial au-
tonomy, in making decision which affect employees above entry level,
is justified.' The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would en-
142. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 264 (citing Guyan Valley, 382 S.E.2d at 90).
143. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 266.
144. Id. at 265.
145. Id. at 265.
146. Id.
147. Davidson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Univ. for W. Illinois Univ.,
920 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1990) and MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766
(11th Cir. 1991).
148. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at-267. But see Hanlon v. Chambers 464 S.E.2d 741, 749 n.6
(W. Va. 1995) (Cleckley, J.) ("[A] civil rights law could not be effective if it protected
from discrimination only people at the bottom of the ladder.").
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courage employers to avoid potential lawsuits and governmental control
over their business decisions by simply not hiring members of protect-
ed classes in the first place. '52
In essence, the court reasoned that Decker's actual compensation
included not only his salary but also the benefits associated with
tenure.'53 In contrast, young professors have greater job stress because
they do not have tenure and they face the possibility that they may
never attain such long-term job security. 5 Therefore, they receive
relatively higher salaries in the short-term to compensate for such inse-
curity regarding their professional futures.'55
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
A. Faculty Compensation Cases
1. Disparate Treatment and Salary Differentials
The court in Decker was notably silent about another West Virgin-
ia faculty compensation case - West Virginia Institute of Technology
v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission.' In West Virginia Insti-
tute of Technology, an Iranian economics professor filed a disparate
treatment claim against the Institute alleging discrimination on the basis
of national origin. Professor Hassan Zavareei alleged that there was a
disparity in the level of his compensation, despite his superior academ-
ic qualifications and teaching experience, compared with that of other
non-Iranian professors.'57 The Institute advanced a job market value
defense and one of its witnesses testified that 'quite often we have
had international people take salaries [offered to them] that we could
not get other people for."" 58 The court responded by stating that
152. Id.
153. d
154. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 268.
155. Id.
156. 383 S.E.2d 490 (W. Va. 1989).
157. West Virginia Inst. of Technology, 383 S.E.2d at 492-93.
158. Id. at 495. In this statement, the Institute was acknowledging that it paid non-
Americans lower salaries than Americans because some non-Americans were willing to work
1996]
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a so-called "job market value" reason advanced by an employer is not
recognized as a legitimate defense to compensation disparity when such
value is premised solely upon an impermissible discrimination, such as pay
distinctions between the sexes, races, respective ethnic backgrounds or
other protected classes. One of the fundamental purposes of
antidiscrimination legislation is to forbid such distinctions. 9
The Institute's facially legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for
the wage disparity was that Zavareei's salary, like that of other profes-
sors, was established at the time of his hire and that no money was
available to adjust his salary subsequently. 60 The plaintiffs, Zavareei
and the Human Rights Commission, were able to establish that this
reason was pretextual by showing that the Institute gave a discretionary
$3,000 salary raise to a non-Iranian professor while failing to use such
discretion on Zavareei's behalf.6 '
The court found that the Institute had intentionally discriminated
against Zavareei by basing its criteria for determining compensation
upon an unlawful criteria (national origin)."' In other words, an em-
ployer is not required to compensate all employees equally so long as
the differences in compensation are not based upon an unlawful crite-
ria. But, for example, "if the difference in labor value of a white print-
er and a black printer stems from the market place putting a different
value on race, Title VII is violated.'16 3 It does not matter if an em-
ployer merely paid the lower going rate for an "international person"
in good faith, Title VII would be violated absent a legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason for the distinction in market rate.'64
for lower salaries.
159. Id. at 496.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 497.
162. West Virginia Inst. of Technology, 383 S.E.2d at 498.
163. Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir.
1981).
164. See Davidson, 920 F.2d at 445-46 ("It is true that an employer cannot defend a
discriminatory wage pattern by pointing to the fact that, as a result of discrimination by
other employers, blacks or women or members of some other statutorily protected group
command lower wages, and it is therefore rational for him to pay them less than he pays
white males. . . . But if he does not discriminate on racial or other forbidden grounds but
merely pays each worker what that worker is worth in the market he is not guilty of dis-
[Vol. 98:719
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2. Disparate Impact and Salary Differentials
The court's ultimate decision in Decker was the correct one. Given
the financial constraints on both the West Virginia Legislature and on
West Virginia University, 5 the court had little choice, as a practical
matter, but to find for the University. Unlike the West Virginia Insti-
tute of Technology case, which dealt with one Iranian professor alleg-
ing salary discrimination on the basis of national origin, the repercus-
sions of a decision against the University in Decker would likely have
had devastating financial repercussions for the State of West Virginia.
Although the Decker court's opinion does not directly address the is-
sue, doubtless the court had to have been conscious of the amount of
money at stake.'66
Furthermore, the decision is perfectly consistent with other dispa-
rate impact faculty compensation cases nationwide.'67 Such a factual
situation, where more experienced, senior employees bring suit alleging
age discrimination on the basis of wage differentials because they are
lower paid than their more youthful colleagues is atypical. Outside
crimination because, on average, black workers are paid less than white, or female less than
male. Otherwise comparable worth would be required by Title VII, and we have held that it
is not.") (citations omitted).
165. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 262.
166. Precise figures are unavailable but one estimate posits that four out of five tenured
faculty at West Virginia University may be over the age of forty. The financial ramifications
of giving all tenured faculty over the age of forty "market rate" wages would clearly be
crippling both for West Virginia and the University.
167. Rosen v. Columbia Univ., No. 92 Civ. 6330, 1995 WL 464991 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7,
1995) (holding that a university's system of determining existing faculty salaries on the basis
of performance and market forces while offering new faculty the salary necessary to meet
and exceed offers made by competing institutions, did not constitute age discrimination under
the ADEA); MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766 (lth Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing that a university's desire to attract and hire good new faculty members was a legitimate
business reason for its practice of paying market rates to newly hired faculty and did not
constitute age discrimination against older faculty members under the ADEA); Davidson v.
Board of Governors of State Colleges & Univ. for W. Illinois Univ., 920 F.2d 441 (7th
Cir. 1990) (finding that a University's compensation scheme, under which existing faculty
could obtain an individual raise only by producing a bona fide job offer from another em-
ployer, while new faculty were not subject to such a limitation, did not discriminate against
older faculty on the basis of age under the ADEA).
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academia such an inversion in wages is highly unusual. The more
usual age-discrimination scenario, dealing with wage differentials, oc-
curs when employers seek to discharge senior, expensive employees
and replace them with more junior, less expensive workers as a cost-
savings measure."'
Economists have sought to explain the reason for this curious
flipflop in the academic labor market." 9 Various theories have been
postulated, 7 ' but the bottom line is that this inverted compensation
pattern is unlikely to disappear soon. Although the court in Decker
stated that there were additional, hidden benefits to attaining seniority
in academia,'7 ' economists have found that nonmonetary forms of
compensation at universities are also probably much less tied to senior-
ity than in a typical workplace.
Regardless of the equities, university professors are unlikely to
succeed in their age discrimination claims against their institutional
employers, on the grounds of wage differentials, in the present legal
climate. 73 Courts have made clear their willingness to accept that
168. Holstein v. Norandex, Inc., 461 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1995) (accepting employer
defense that firing of 63 year old employee was a cost cutting measure); Diamantopulos v.
Brookside Corp., 683 F. Supp. 322 (D. Conn. 1988) (accepting employer's defense that
younger applicant for supervisory position was chosen because he was willing to accept a
lower annual salary than the older applicant).
169. Michael R. Ransom, Seniority and Monopsony In The Academic Labor Market, 83
AM. ECON. REv. 221 (1993) [hereinafter Ransom] (stating that in a 1990 survey by the
American Council on Education, more than half of the institutions surveyed responded that
they had some departments in which new, junior faculty members had been hired at salaries
above those of some of the senior faculty members in the same department).
170. See Ransom, supra note 169, at 232 (Citing data showing a negative correlation
between seniority and salary even after adjusting for other variables. Findings are consistent
with a heterogeneity model derived from monopsonistic salary discrimination by universities).
The Harris-Holstrom model (1982) holds that faculty are being paid their market value -
the best professors can find employment anywhere but the less able have to stay where they
are. Id. at 229. See also Howard P. Tuckman et al., Faculty Skills and The Salary Structure
In Academe: A Market Perspective, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 692 (1977) (arguing that the sala-
ries of faculty members are determined to a substantial degree by market valuation of their
skills).
171. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 268.
172. See Ransom, supra note 169, at 229 (stating that, for example, the availability of
paid leave is similar for most professors of all levels, whereas, within the workplace at
large, paid leave is traditionally tied to seniority).
173. Columbia University, 1995 WL 464991 at *8 ("While this pattern may seem, and
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universities have a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to pay market
rates to attract and hire high quality, new faculty, 74 thereby permit-
ting the use of dual compensation systems.
B. The Updated Disparate Impact Analysis of Decker
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia's decision in
Decker is significant primarily for its endorsement of the use of the
disparate impact theory to prove an age discrimination case in West
Virginia under the Human Rights Act. 75 This is in sharp contrast to
the uncertainty of the theory's use at the federal level under the
ADEA.' 76
In Decker, the court drew heavily on the language of Title VII in
its analysis of Decker's age discrimination claim. '77 Significantly, the
court changed the disparate impact model articulated in Guyan Val-
ley'7 8 to adopt the statutory modifications of the Civil Rights Act of
1991.'17 Justice Cleckley, in his opinion in Barefoot v. Sundale Nurs-
in fact be, unfair to academicians who devote substantial portions of their career to a single
institution ... the trend reflects market forces that universities must take into account in
hiring and salary decisions.").
174. University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d at 773.
175. The court's statement that "the majority of circuits considering this issue have
decided to apply disparate impact analysis to claims arising under the ADEA," is somewhat
disingenuous. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 264. All but one of the six cited authorities supporting
this position were decided pre-Hazen Paper (1993), whereas the single contra authority was
decided in 1994. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 264 n.6. As Decker brought his claim under the
West Virginia Human Rights Act, which recognizes the availability of disparate impact anal-
ysis for all plaintiffs, it was not necessary for the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
to consider the availability of the disparate impact model under the ADEA, so although
misleading this statement is of little practical import.
176. The three concurring justices in Hazen Paper (Kennedy, Rehnquist and Thomas)
agreed that there were substantial arguments for not extending Title VII disparate impact to
the ADEA. This, coupled with the trend of recent case law, indicates that the availability of
disparate impact analysis under the ADEA looks bleak. See supra note 96 (listing cases
which hold that disparate impact analysis is unavailable under the ADEA).
177. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 264, 266 nn.11-12.
178. Guyan Valley Hosp. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 88 (W.
Va. 1989).
179. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 266.
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ing Home,18 summarized Decker's updated model for presenting dis-
parate impact discrimination claims under the Human Rights Act.'
In analyzing Decker's claim of age discrimination, the court found
the University's reliance on the average salary figures in the AACSB
survey to be clearly job related in the context of hiring highly special-
ized faculty.'82 It further found that setting starting salaries according
to market rates is a business necessity if the University's stated goals
of attracting qualified new faculty and maintaining its accreditation are
to be maintained.'83 The court did not explain or clarify the meaning
of either term.' The court rejected the alternative business practice
suggested by the Human Rights Commission.8 5 The Commission had
suggested that the University could pay its new faculty hires below
market rate without sacrificing its academic standards, arguing that it
would then be able to pay its existing faculty more and eliminate the
wage disparity.'86
180. Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 457 S.E.2d 152 (W. Va. 1995).
181. Justice Cleckley stated:
In proving a prima facie case of disparate impact under the Human Rights
Act, . . . the plaintiff bears the burden of (1) demonstrating that the employer uses
a particular employment practice or policy and (2) establishing that such particular
employment practice or policy causes a disparate impact on a class protected by
the Human Rights Act. The employer then must prove that the practice is "job
related" and "consistent with business necessity." If the employer proves business
necessity, the plaintiff may rebut the employer's defense by showing that a less
burdensome alternative practice exists which the employer refuses to adopt. Such a
showing would be evidence that employer's policy is a "pretext" for discrimination.
Id. at 165-66.
182. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 266 (emphasis added).
183. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 267 (emphasis added).
184. Justice Cleckley defined the meaning of "business necessity" in his opinion in
Barefoot. "A defendant can sustain the business necessity defense only by bearing the burden
of proving through evidence (and not merely judicial intuition) that its challenged employ-
ment practice is not only related to its employee's ability to do the job in question, but also
is necessary to achieve an important employer objective." Barefoot, 457 S.E.2d at 166 n.21.
See also Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 870 F. Supp. 389, 400 (D. Maine 1994) ("In an at-
tempt to capture the essence of these two terms, this Court has made a logical definitional
distinction between them. That is, business necessity inquires whether the job criteria arises
out of a manifest business need and the job related standard inquires whether there is a
correlation between the criteria used and successful job performance.") (emphasis added).
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In addition to refining the disparate impact inquiry, the court also
continued its policy" 7 of applying current law to employment dis-
crimination claims regardless of when the claims accrued.'88 No poli-
cy reason for this approach was articulated.
C. The Challenge Before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia
1. Title VII and the ADEA
The Decker opinion makes clear that Title VII is the role model
for the Human Rights Act and, it is therefore to Title VII that the
court will look for inspiration when developing Human Rights Act case
law."9 This should logically foreclose relying on ADEA case law, on
those occasions that it diverges from Title VII case law, when dealing
with an alleged violation of the Human Rights Act in an age discrimi-
nation case. 9 ' To confuse the two federal statutes would risk diluting
187. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has had a policy of examining
discrimination claims in the light of current employment discrimination law as opposed to
the law in effect at the time the cause of action allegedly accrued. See Guyan Valley, 382
S.E.2d at 91. In that case the plaintiffs cause of action accrued in July 1976 when she was
not hired by the employer for allegedly discriminatory reasons. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Justice Neely, applied the Title VII disparate
impact analysis as it existed at the time of the litigation and not as it had existed at the
time of the refusal to hire. Disparate impact analysis under Title VII had been modified by
the Supreme Court in its 1989 Wards Cove decision and it was this model of analysis that
was adopted in Guyan Valley. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Wards Cove.
188. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 265 n.10.
189. "To prevail under disparate impact, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's
facially neutral policy has a disproportionate adverse impact on the basis of the protected
trait. . . . [SJee also, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)." Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 264. In Decker, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as the stan-
dard for disparate impact analysis under the Human Rights Act for all protected classes. Id.
at 266. See also Barefoot, 457 S.E.2d at 159 ("We have consistently held that cases brought
under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va Code, 5-11-1, et seq., are governed by
the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our
statute's language does not direct otherwise."). See also Woodall v. International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, Local 596, 453 S.E.2d 656, 658 n.6 (W. Va. 1994) (West Virginia is not
bound by federal law but will adopt federal precedent that is compatible with the Human
Rights Act).
190. For example there is no "reasonable factor other than age" defense under the West
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the anti-discriminatory protections of the Human Rights Act available
to age-discrimination plaintiffs.
The distinctions between a discrimination analysis under the ADEA
and Title VII have been justified by differences in the statutory lan-
guage, 9' judicial decision-making, 92  and legislative intent. 9 '
Courts have interpreted the ADEA as giving employers more leeway
when considering factors that disparately affect older workers under the
ADEA than factors that disparately affect Title VII's protected class-
es.194 Therefore, given that classes protected by the Human Rights
Act are treated equally,19 the risk is that the less rigorous standards
of the ADEA in allowing cost as a factor other than age, will weaken
the protection available to victims of other types of discrimination such
as race, gender, and disability. For example, under the ADEA, it is
acceptable for an employer to lower overhead costs by discharging
more expensive, senior employees.'96 But it is hard to imagine that
an employer could opportunistically discharge its most costly employ-
Virginia Human Rights Act or Title VII, unlike under the ADEA.
191. Title VII does not include a "reasonable factor other than . . . " defense as avail-
able under the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). See also Michael D. Moberly, Reconsidering
the Discriminatory Motive Requirement in ADEA Disparate Treatment Cases, 24 N.M. L.
REV. 89, 96 (1994) (noting that Title VII has no equivalent to the reasonable factor clause).
192. See U.S. Equal Emp. Opp. Comm'n. v. Newport Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 893 F.
Supp. 927, 932 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (Noting that the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit
have already found that the "business necessity" of Title VII is analogous to ADEA, 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) and (2). Therefore, if the defense is already provided by these sections,
the reasonable factor clause of 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) would be surplusage.).
193. Congress codified its post-Wards Cove disparate impact analysis into Title VII by
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Congress took no such steps to amend the
ADEA. Therefore, if a court finds that ADEA plaintiffs may bring a disparate impact claim,
litigants will be bound by the Supreme Court's Wards Cove framework of analysis and not
the more pro-plaintiff framework codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See supra notes
50-54 and accompanying text.
194. Newport Mesa, 893 F. Supp. at 932. See also Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th Cir. 1992) (declining to extend reach of Title VII amend-
ments to the ADEA). Cf Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co., 58 F.3d 144, 152 (5th Cir.
1995) (accusing plaintiff of confusing Title VII disparate impact case law with his ADEA
claim).
195. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 265 ("Therefore, if disparate impact has been applied by
this court to other cases arising under the Human Rights Act, it would similarly be applied
to claims of age-based discrimination.").
196. Birbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 1994).
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ees if their higher cost was due, not to years of service and seniority,
but rather to the cost of reasonably accommodating their disabilities. In
ruling on age discrimination claims, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia should be careful to avoid creating precedents which
would be harmful to other Human Rights Act plaintiffs.
2. Cost Justification Defenses to Discrimination
The extent to which the "reasonable factor other than age" excep-
tion under the ADEA exempts an employer from liability for actions
taken on the basis of cost is still unclear.197 This is the question cur-
rently at the heart of the debate about the use of disparate impact
analysis under the ADEA.'98 EEOC regulations state that the lower
cost of employing younger employees as a group does not justify
screening out or discharging older employees.199 However this provi-
sion has received little deference from the courts."0 Courts are often
reluctant to interfere with managerial decisions regarding what consti-
tutes a business necessity.
20 1
197. See Louise Witt, Middle-Aged Squeeze: More Workers are Going to Court With
the Charge That Age Cost Them Professionally, DETRorr FREE PRESS, Jan. 31, 1994, at 8F.
198. See Browne, supra note 57, at 370 ("The argument against a cost-justification in
disparate impact cases is a fundamentally incoherent one. Indeed a cost-justification defense
is compelled by the logic of the disparate-impact theory . . . . "). See also Hugh S. Wil-
son, A Second Look At Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimi-
nation and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV. 844, 851 (1972) ("Business
necessity can only meaningfully be measured in terms of dollars and cents."); Metz, 828
F.2d at 1219 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("It is hard to imagine how the use of wages
could not be valid; wages correspond precisely to the costs of doing business, and hence to
profitability.").
199. "A differentiation based on the average cost of employing older employees as a
group is unlawful except with respect to employee benefit plans which qualify for the sec-
tion 4(f)(2) exception to the Act" 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(f) (1995).
200. See EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 947 (4th Cir. 1992) (Ignoring
regulatory language in reaching its decision in favor of the defendant-employer. The dissent
cites the regulation to support its position.); Rivas v. Federacion de Asociaciones Pecurias de
Puerto Rico, 929 F.2d 814, 821-22 (1st Cir. 1991) (suggesting a way for employers to cir-
cumvent the language of § 1625.7(f)); Metz, 828 F.2d at 1205 cited the regulation, but the
case was subsequently overruled by Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (7th
Cir. 1994).
201. See Fumco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.)
("Courts are generally less competent than employers to restructure business practices, and
1996]
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The success of the market rate defense, as used by the University
in Decker, should be viewed in the context of the more general devel-
opment of cost-based defenses in disparate impact litigation.2"2 "Again
we observe the phenomenon of judicial rejection of cost containment as
a justification for discrimination which is overt and direct . . . contrast-
ed with acceptance of such justification when the discrimination results
from the operation of a 'neutral' rule (like market rate)."2 3 Any mar-
ket-based compensation scheme will inevitably result in salary differen-
tials.2"' Justice Neely further described this market rate defense in
Largent v. West Virginia Division of Health. °5 He explained that, un-
der the Civil Service Regulations and Rules, employees who are doing
the same work must be placed within the same classification.2 6 But
pay differences are permissible within that classification based on
"market forces, education, experience, recommendations, qualifications,
meritorious service, length of service, availability of funds or other
specifically identifiable criteria that are reasonable and that advance the
interests of the employer."207
3. The Significance of the Decker Decision
At present, employees over the age of forty receive the same
protections under the Human Rights Act as employees alleging that
their employers have discriminated against them on the grounds of
their race, gender or other "protected" classifications.2 ' This is not
true at the federal level where the protections available to an ADEA
plaintiff are more restricted than those available to a Title VII plaintiff.
Judging from recent trends, Title VII and ADEA case law will contin-
ue to diverge. Therefore, one can conclude that it may become increas-
unless mandated to do so by Congress, they should not attempt it.").
202. Mark S. Brodin, Costs, Profits, And Equal Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
318, 356 (1987).
203. Id. at 356-57.
204. Cf Davidson, 920 F.2d at 446 (describing the market at work).
205. Largent v. West Virginia Div. of Health, 452 S.E.2d 42 (W. Va. 1994) (equal pay
for equal work case).
206. Id. at 48.
207. Id. at 49.
208. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 265.
[Vol. 98:719
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ingly difficult for West Virginia courts to treat age plaintiffs in the
same way as other Human Rights Act plaintiffs when there is compel-
ling federal case law holding that age-discrimination cases should be
judged by a different standard. As Justice Neely has often stated, hard
cases make bad law.2"9
The Decker court explained its reluctance to distinguish age as a
protected class by stating that it was not free to fashion a distinction
absent legislative action.210 However, the court also stated that "[o]ur
Human Rights Act prohibits deliberate treatment of persons differently
because of different individual traits unrelated to the work environ-
ment."' A creative employer could use this language to argue that
an employee's age is related to his abilities to perform at work, there-
by justifying treating employees differently on the basis of age.212
This job-related defense makes sense when dealing with an
employer's refusal to hire, denial of promotion to or selection for dis-
charge of an older employee. However, job-relatedness has little to do
with wage discrimination situations such as that in Decker. For the
most part employers in wage discrimination cases have relied upon
cost-justification as a defense. Courts have been uncomfortable with
second-guessing an employer's managerial decision-making. Conse-
quently courts are reluctant to require either that employers not make
employment decisions based on wage differentials or that all employees
be paid "market rates." Such requirements could impose burdensome
costs on an employer and inhibit its ability to compete. This was par-
ticularly true in Decker where not only the University but the State
faced huge financial costs if the court had agreed with the Human
Rights Commission and found in Decker's favor.
209. State ex rel. Hamstead v. Dostert, 313 S.E.2d 409, 419 (W. Va. 1984) (Neely, J.,
dissenting); State v. International Union of Oil, Chemical, & Atomic Workers, 298 S.E.2d
827, 834 (W. Va. 1982) (Neely, J., dissenting); Board of Educ. v. W. Harley Miller, Inc.,
221 S.E.2d 882, 886 n.3 (W. Va. 1975) (Neely, J., concurring).
210. Decker, 447 S.E.2d at 265.
211. 447 S.E.2d 259 (W. Va. 1994).
212. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text discussing "age" as a protected
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Cost justification as a defense to discrimination will continue to
evolve and the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia will con-
tinue to look to developments under both Title VII and the ADEA at
the federal level when faced with the issue again in the future. Em-
ployment scenarios where senior employees receive lower or equal
salaries to those of their junior colleagues are so rare outside the world
of academia that it is difficult to anticipate how the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia will rely on its decision in West Virginia
University v. Decker in the future.
The Decker decision would be easy enough to distinguish given
the unlikelihood of a factually similar compensation system occurring
in the business world. On the other hand, so far the court has shown
interest in extending its rationale in Decker to other non-Human Rights
Act cases." 3 In Largent, the court referred to Decker to support its
statement that employers should have flexibility in their hiring process-
es to allow for fluctuations in market conditions.2"4 Therefore, age
discrimination plaintiffs who appeal Human Rights Act cases to the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in the future can antici-
pate little success if their victory would restrict their employer's ability
to compete economically.
V. CONCLUSION
Cost-based age discrimination represents society's struggle to bal-
ance its interests in protecting the reasonable expectations of its older
employees and in defending the rights of employers to respond to
market conditions. West Virginia University v. Decker exemplifies this
struggle. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was con-
fronted by Decker's sense of injustice that younger, inexperienced
faculty received greater compensation than himself, on the one hand,
and the University's financial inability to pay all of its faculty market-
rate salaries, on the other. The court has now chosen to accept an
employer's cost-justification for salary differentials among employees,
absent intentional discrimination. The court continues to treat age dis-
213. Largent, 452 S.E.2d 42 (W. Va. 1994).
214. Id. at 49.
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crimination plaintiffs in the same fashion as other discrimination plain-
tiffs, and has confinmed that a disparate impact theory of discrimination
is available to all plaintiffs under the Human Rights Act.
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